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Introduction
Recent media releases and reports from investment firms have highlighted that many directors fail to meet the requirements of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) to report their trades within five business days of the transactions. 1 These reports also document that some directors are in breach of the Corporations Act, which requires them to report to the market within fourteen days. With corporate governance being given greater focus in Australia and overseas, there is a need for the extent of late reporting to be closely examined. Brown, Foo and Watson (2003) also report that Australian directors on average achieve abnormal returns from trading in shares of their own companies. The current paper extends upon the Brown et al. evidence. We also examine the feasibility of imitators achieving abnormal return from a trading strategy of buying (selling) shares when directors report buying (selling) activity in their own stock. Such analysis has been undertaken for the US market by Seyhun (1986) , but is absent in Australia.
The motivation and contribution of the paper is therefore threefold. Firstly, the paper provides the first academic research into the extent of late reporting by directors in Australia. Secondly, it provides an examination of the abnormal returns earned by imitators from a trading strategy of buying (selling) shares when directors report buying (selling) activity in their own stock. Thirdly, an analysis is undertaken to determine whether directors are able to earn abnormal returns over the period between their trading in shares and the subsequent reporting of those trades. This final section is extended by providing an analysis to determine whether directors late reporting increases the abnormal returns directors are able to earn that are not available to other investors. This approach has not been employed in previous studies. Notably, it shows that returns are being missed by outside investors due to late reporting.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the relevant literature, Section 3 provides a discussion of the methodology, Section 4 examines the data collection and the results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 provides a summary.
Literature Review
Discussion regarding the late reporting of trading by directors in their own company shares in Australia has largely been confined to the media. The most comprehensive study of director trades in Australia following the mandatory reporting of such trades is by Brown, Foo and Watson (2003) . This study hypothesises that directors behave as contrarian investors, using inside information to buy shares when they are underpriced and to sell shares when they are overpriced.
Major findings by Brown, Foo and Watson (2003) are that directors achieve abnormal returns from sales (particularly for resource companies) in that by selling they avoid future losses; however, the purchases do not capture future abnormal price rises.
They do not find any bias due to the size of the company or the size of trade.
Additional Australian studies demonstrate that directors are trading on inside information, that at least some of these trades achieve abnormal returns and that some strategies could provide abnormal returns to an imitator. Chang and Chopra (2007) conclude that Australian director trades contain industry information and an imitator can avoid losses by investing in the relevant industry following a trade by a director. Freeman and Adams (1999) examine the extent of insider trading in Australia, prior to the introduction of reporting requirements by the ASX, based on a survey of company directors. They report (p. 1) that "a significant proportion of directors indicated a propensity to time their trades based on inside information". Watson and Young (1998) show that insider trading occurs at the time surrounding takeover announcements in Australia. Hotson, Kaur and Singh (2007) also show that directors and imitators profit from trades in small companies.
Internationally, the most comprehensive study of director trading was undertaken by Seyhun (1986) using US data. He finds that directors achieve abnormal returns from both sales and purchases of shares in their own companies.
However, he shows that imitators could not achieve abnormal returns using a trading strategy that mimics the behaviour of the directors. He also shows that those who are expected to know more about the overall affairs of the firm, such as chairmen of the boards of directors or officer-directors, make better trades than officers or share holders alone. In addition, he concludes that insiders know on which inside information to rely and can exploit this information by adjusting the volume of trading. He also shows that the size of the company is important and that ignoring greater transaction costs for smaller companies may result in an overstatement of abnormal returns achieved by smaller companies.
Several international studies have analysed insider trading abnormal returns available to directors of different sized companies. Seyhun (1986) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that abnormal returns are achieved by insiders for purchases of shares in small companies. Gregory, Matatko, Tonks and Purkis (1994) also demonstrate that UK directors can achieve abnormal returns particularly in small companies. However, they show that applying a benchmark that takes account of company size eliminates abnormal returns. Brown, Foo and Watson (2003) confirm that company size does not impact the abnormal returns in such trading activity.
Given that the data available for the current study is biased towards larger stocks (those in the All Ordinaries Index), we do not conduct analyses conditioned on size.
International studies attempt to find additional indicators for abnormal returns of insider trades by directors. Baesel and Stein (1979) show that US directors earn abnormal returns by trading in their own company's shares, and that bank directors achieve the largest abnormal returns. Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (2002) show that medium sized trades by UK directors can predict future returns, but that this trading strategy does not result in abnormal returns. Hillier and Marshall (2002) find that director's trading in unison can be a good indicator for future share prices.
A strong asymmetry in insider trading profits is widely documented. Jeng, Metrick and Zeckhauser (2003) find that US directors earn 6% p.a. abnormal returns by purchasing shares of their own companies, but that no abnormal returns are achieved from the sale of shares. Pope, Morris and Peel (1990) find that there appears to be a sharp market movement around the time director's trade in shares of their own company, particularly on the sell side.
The length of time over which abnormal returns are achieved is also examined in international studies. Friederich, Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (2002) show that UK directors achieve abnormal returns from short term trades. Ke, Huddart and Petroni (2003) There is still some debate about whether those attempting to imitate trades by directors, purchasing (selling) shares when directors report that they have purchased (sold) shares in their own company, can achieve abnormal returns. Gregory, Matatko and Tonks (1997) conclude that abnormal returns can be made by imitators when UK directors sell. Lin and Howe (1990) show that in the US, transaction costs eliminate profits by both inside traders and imitators.
Research Method
This study uses the standard event study methodology to examine the abnormal returns from director trades in the shares of their own company 2 . The first section of analysis examines the returns to directors from trading in shares of their own companies -day 0 is the day the trade takes place. The second section of analysis examines whether abnormal returns could be earned by an imitator who trades based on when directors trade -day 0 is the day the trade is reported to the market. The final section of analysis investigates the returns achieved by directors between the time they trade in shares of their own company and the time the trade is reported to the market -day 0 is the day the trade takes place, however, the returns are excluded from the analysis when the trade is reported to the market. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using market model estimates based on the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index from 250 days to 20 days prior to the trade.
The pre-event period is 14 days prior to either the trade taking place or the trade being reported to the market. The post-event period includes the day of the trade taking place or the trade being reported and 14 days after either the trade taking place or the trade being reported to the market.
Data
The For example, for each company-size category, 87% of trades are reported within 5 business days. However, for this sample the failure to report sales within 5 business days is particularly apparent for larger companies, with 18%, 14% and 12% of director sales for large, medium and small companies respectively being reported after 5 business days.
When purchases and sales are consider together, there is also no relationship between the size of the trade and timeliness of reporting. However, where the trade size is small, only 77% of sales are reported with 5 business days, as compared with 81% for the medium sized trades and 88% for the largest sized trades.
Information regarding the number of trades and the time taken to report trades for resource companies and non-resource companies was also collected. When purchases and sales are considered together, directors of resources companies more often report trades within 5 business days than do directors of non-resource companies. For example, for resource companies, 92% of trades are reported within 5 business days whereas for non-resource companies 87% of trades are reported within 5 business days. This pattern is particularly apparent for sales with 8% of trades being reported after 5 business days for resource companies and 16% of trades being reported after 5 business days for non-resource companies.
These results show the extent of non-compliance with the ASX rules and with the Australian legal requirements by directors required to report trades in their own companies to the market. Approximately 13% (7%) of all trades are not reported to the ASX (market) within the specified timeframe. Such late reporting by directors confirms the perception that the market is not being informed in a timely manner. Table 2 shows average abnormal returns before and after trades by directors in their own-company shares. For this analysis and all analysis of returns associated with director trades, where more than one director purchased (sold) shares on the same day, only the trade that was reported first was included in the analysis. This screen reduced the sample of purchases (sales) from 2189 (743) to 1949 (632).
Results

Returns for Trades by Directors in Relation to the Day of Trade
For the total sample, the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days prior to directors purchasing shares was -2.0% and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, while the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days following the trade was 0.3% and not significantly different from zero. Conversely, the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days prior to directors selling shares was 2.7% and significantly different from zero, with the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days following the trade being -1.1% and significantly different from zero. These results demonstrate that directors avoid losses of 1.1% by selling shares in their own companies. likely that there is also considerable failure to report trades at all, the finding that abnormal returns are associated with trades that are reported within a 5-day period is suggestive that failure to report is not be associated with abnormal return performance.
For resource companies, the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days prior to directors purchasing shares was -2.4% and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, while the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days following the trade was 1.6% and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Conversely, the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days prior to directors selling shares was 3.6% and significantly different from zero, with the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days following the trade being -1.6% and not significantly different from zero.
These results demonstrate that directors of resource companies achieve cumulative abnormal returns of 1.6% by purchasing shares in their own companies.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of Table 2 . It shows the cumulative abnormal daily returns for 14 days before and after purchases and sales by company directors. The cumulative abnormal returns prior to a purchase are negative and significant, while the cumulative abnormal returns after the purchase are positive but not significant. The significant positive returns prior to a sale are followed by significantly negative returns after the sale.
The results reported in this section are broadly consistent with Brown, Foo and Watson (2003) in that prior to purchases companies experienced negative returns and prior to sales, companies experienced positive returns. Following the purchases there are slightly positive returns and following the sales there are negative returns The results for resource companies are also consistent with Brown, Foo and Watson (2003) in that the purchase (sale) of shares by directors of resource companies is followed by positive (negative) returns, however we do not find that the abnormal returns following sales are statistically significant. This finding is also consistent with Pope, Morris and Peel (1990) who conclude that directors do make abnormal returns particularly in being able to avoid losses by selling prior to share price falls.
Returns from a Trading Strategy from the Day of Reporting the Trades
This section demonstrates a trading strategy for an outsider to imitate trades by directors by purchasing (selling) shares when a director discloses to the market that they have purchased (sold) shares. It examines the returns before and after purchases and sales of company shares are reported. Table 3 shows average abnormal returns to imitators before and after directors report trades in their own-company shares. For the total sample, the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days prior to directors reporting purchasing shares was -1.5% and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, while the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days following the trade being reported was 0.0% and not significantly different from zero. Conversely, the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days prior to directors reporting selling shares was 1.5% and significantly different from zero, with the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days following the trade being reported being -1.7% and significantly different from zero. Results in section 5.1 demonstrate that directors avoid losses of 1.1% by selling shares in their own companies. This section demonstrates that imitators could achieve an abnormal return of 1.7% by short-selling shares when directors report the sale of shares. As noted by Seyhun (1986) , while transaction costs will be heterogeneous across firm size, trading volume and trade size, it is likely that after allowing for such costs abnormal returns are likely to be small. For resource companies, the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days prior to directors reporting purchasing shares was -2.1% and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, while the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days following the trade being reported was 1.4% and significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Conversely, the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days prior to directors reporting selling shares was 2.4% and significantly different from zero, with the cumulative abnormal return over the 14 days following the trade being reported being -2.7% and significantly different from zero. Results in section 5.1 demonstrate that directors of resource companies achieve cumulative abnormal returns of 1.6% by purchasing shares in their own companies. This section demonstrates that imitators could achieve an abnormal return of 1.4% by purchasing shares when directors report the purchase of shares.
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of Table 3 . It shows the cumulative abnormal daily returns for 14 days before and after the reporting of purchases and sales by company directors. The cumulative abnormal returns prior to a purchase being reported are negative and significant. The cumulative abnormal returns after the purchase are positive but not statistically significant. The positive returns prior to a sale being reported are followed by significantly negative returns after the sale is reported. However, there is some evidence that the peak in positive returns prior to sales and negative returns prior to purchases occurs prior to the trades being reported.
Abnormal Returns from Trades by Directors prior to Reporting the Trades
This section analyses returns to directors after they trade but before they announce the trade to the market. Day zero is defined as the day the director trades in shares of their own company. This section also analyses returns to directors five days after they trade but before they announce the trade to the market. The reported abnormal returns are those from a portfolio that has an equal weight in all shares from time zero to the day prior to the trade being reported.
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For the full sample of purchases, the cumulative abnormal return after purchases but before the reporting of the trade is not significantly different from zero.
This suggests that directors do not earn abnormal returns after purchasing shares in their own companies that is not available to the market due to the delay in reporting.
However, the cumulative abnormal return after sales but before the reporting of the sale, was small (-0.2%) but significantly less than zero. This suggests that directors are able to avoid a small but statistically significant price fall that may not be avoided by the market due to the delay in reporting.
Table 4 also shows that the overall results are largely driven by directors who report trades within 5 business days of the trade taking place. The cumulative abnormal return after sales but before the reporting of the sale, was small (-0.2%) but significantly less than zero. For trades reported between 5 and 14 days after the trade and trades not reported within 14 days, none of the cumulative abnormal return after purchases (sales) but before the reporting of the purchase (sale) are significantly different from zero. Table 5 shows returns to directors five days after they trade but before they announce the trade to the market. The cumulative abnormal return five days after sales but before the reporting of the sale, was -0.6% and significantly less than zero.
This may be considered an estimate of the "cost" borne by people who have traded the shares in the interim. This shows the public policy (and class action) aspects of the issue in that it quantifies the loss that is caused to some investors by the lateness of the disclosure.
For resource companies, none of the cumulative abnormal returns after purchases (sales) but before the reporting of the purchase (sale) are significantly different from zero.
Summary
We investigate the extent of directors breaching the reporting requirements of the ASX and the Corporations Act in Australia. We also update the work of Brown, Foo and Watson (2003) to determine whether directors in Australia achieve abnormal returns from trades in their own companies. We apply the methodology of Seyhun (1986) in determining whether an imitator could mimic director trades to earn abnormal returns. Previous research is extended to determine the abnormal returns available to directors between the time of insider trades and the time they report these trades to the market. This methodology has not been adopted in previous literature.
Consistent with research by Brown, Foo and Watson (2003) this analysis is conducted for all companies, resource companies and non-resource companies. Analysis is also conducted for trades reported within 5 business day, between 5 and 14 business days and trades not reported within 14 business days.
On average, 13% (7%) of insider trades are not reported within the five (14) business days required by the ASX (as specified in the Corporations Act). Second, directors do appear to act as contrarian investors, purchasing (selling) shares when the price is low (high). Third, directors do achieve abnormal returns through trading in shares of their own companies. The abnormal returns are highest for purchases in resource companies where directors achieve abnormal returns by purchasing shares prior to the share price rising. These results are largely driven by directors who report trades within 5 business days Fourth, imitators adopting a strategy of purchasing (selling) when directors purchase (sell) shares secure a small abnormal return.
However, it is highly unlikely that this abnormal return could cover transaction costs and the buy/sell spread. Fifth, analysis of returns to directors after they trade but before they announce the trade to the market shows that, over this period, directors are making small but statistically significant returns that are not available to the market. 
